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Abstract
We introduce Cournot competition and endogenous entry in
an otherwise neoclassical macroeconomic framework. First, we
develop a model with exogenous savings à la Solow describing the
dynamic path of business creation. Then, we develop a model à la
Ramsey describing the dynamic interaction of consumption and
business creation. Our models are able to explain why markups
vary countercylically and prots are procyclical. The analysis of
permanent and temporary technology and preference shocks and
of the second moments suggests that our model can outperform
the Real Business Cycle framework in many dimensions.
We are grateful to Guido Ascari, Lilia Cavallari, Alex Cuckierman, Alberto Dal-
mazzo, Stefano Gnocchi, Tiziano Ropele and Patrizio Tirelli for insightful discussions
on this topic. Correspondence: Federico Etro, University of Milan, Bicocca, Depart-
ment of Economics, U6-360, Piazza dellAteneo nuovo 1, Milano 20126, Italy.
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1 Introduction
The neoclassical macroeconomic theory and the theory of Real Business
Cycles are based on dynamic models with perfect competition, constant
returns to scale and capital accumulation. In these frameworks there is
no space for an analysis of imperfect market structures, of the dynamic
of markups and extra prots and of the entry process, all elements that
are quite important in real world markets.
In this paper we consider a innite horizon economy characterized by
a representative market for a standard homogenous good and without
capital. Rather than assuming perfect competition between the rms, we
assume that they compete in quantities and we characterize the Cournot
equilibrium as a function of the number of active rms in each period.
Building on Bilbiee et al (2007) the number of rms is endogenized
with the introduction of sunk costs of production such that in every
period entry occurs until it guarantees a non-negative net value of ex-
pected prots. Strategic interaction together with the endogenous mar-
ket structure allow our exible prices economy to deliver business cycles
with features consistent with a large body of empirical evidence. This is
so whether the model is hit by demand or supply shocks.
First of all it shows procyclical prots, which is an uncontroversial
empirical fact as argued by Bilbiie et al (2007b). Also it displays coun-
tercyclical mark ups, a pattern forcefully emphasized by Portier (1995),
Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (2000).
Further it accounts for procyclical rmsentry as documented by Chat-
terjee and Cooper (1993) for the U.S., Portier (1995) for France and
more recently by Jaimovich (2007) who updates and extends the evi-
dence relative to the U.S.
These facts are hardly matched within the neoclassical framework,
or even in its extensions to monopolistic competition a là Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987), which neglects strategic interactions and entry.
Our rst step is to develop a model with exogenous savings à la Solow
(1956) describing the dynamic path of business creation. This allows us
to obtain a model in which it is not investment in the physical capital to
generate the accumulation of capital input over time, as in the original
Solow model, but it is entry of new rms to generate the creation of
new productive business. Since entry strengthens competition reducing
the markups and the individual prots, entry also induces a sort of
decreasing marginal productivity of business creation, just like capital
accumulation reduces the marginal productivity of capital in the Solow
model. Therefore both models generate a gradual convergence toward
a steady state, in the standard Solow case through a decreasing rate of
the growth of the capital stock, in our case through a decreasing rate of
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business creation.
In the main part of the paper we develop a model à la Ramsey
(1928) describing the dynamic interaction of consumption and business
creation. We show that our model is able to explain why markups vary
countercyclically and prots are procyclical, and is also able to empha-
size a new propagation mechanism associated with imperfect competi-
tion. To see why, consider a temporary technology shock that increases
productivity and demand. On impact, such a shock increases the prof-
its of the existing rms, attracting further entry. The increase in the
number of rms enhances competition between them and reduces the
markups and the prices. This, in turn, temporarily pushes consumption
and propagates the shock. Of course, Cournot competition introduces
an extra e¤ect due to the change in the markups which is completely
absent in a model with perfectly competitive markets (or even in a stan-
dard model with monopolistic competition where markups are constant
and entry is not taken in consideration). The analysis of permanent and
temporary technology shocks and preference shocks, and the analysis of
the second moment properties suggests that our model can outperform
the Real Business Cycle framework (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; King
and Rebelo, 2000) in many dimensions.
The same mechanism working under Cournot competition is of course
active under other forms of imperfect competition as well. We ana-
lyze two basic alternatives: a conjectural variation model, which nests
Cournot competition and higher levels of collusion as particular cases,
and a model of Stackelberg competition with one leader and endogenous
entry of followers.
A closer attention to endogenous entry and endogenous mark ups has
recently characterized the macroeconomic literature on general equilib-
rium models for closed and open economies. Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
provide a relevant application to trade and business cycle, Etro (2007b)
introduces strategic interactions with endogenous entry in basic models
of trade, growth and business cycles. Most important for our purposes,
after early attempts to endogenize entry with xed costs of production
in each period (notably Chattejee and Cooper, 1993, and Devereux et
al., 1996),1 the recent work of Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b) has provided an
important contribution on endogenous entry in a stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium model. This line of research does not take in consid-
eration the strategic interactions between rms and the impact of entry
on them, but it focuses on the traditional case of constant mark ups
1Cooper (1999) surveys this early literature. Chatterjee et al. (1993) endogenize
entry as well, but their focus is on sunspots equilibria in an OLG model.
3
due to monopolistic competition.2 Recently, Jaimovich and Floetotto
(2008) have augmented the model of Deveraux et al. (1996) with mark
ups depending on the number of rms. That model endogenizes entry
through xed costs of production in each period, so that prots are again
zero at all times, and not procyclical as in our framework, and it focuses
on di¤erent issues, nevertheless it complements our work suggesting a
crucial role for market structures in explaining the business cycle.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 devel-
ops the model with exogenous savings and the model with endogenous
savings. Section 3 calibrates the latter and simulates the reaction to
permanent and temporary supply shocks. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We develop a very simple general equilibrium growth model without
capital and with imperfect competition in quantities in a representative
market for homogenous goods.3 In our favorite specication rms com-
pete a là Cournot, however below we analyze alternative competitive
frameworks.
Consider a representative sector characterized by Nt rms in each pe-
riod t, all producing the same consumption good under imperfect com-
petition. Each rm i produces yt(i) according to a linear production
function:
yt(i) = AtL (i)
where At is exogenous TFP common to all rms, and L(i) is the la-
bor input. Given the nominal wage Wt, the constant marginal cost of
production is Wt=A. Total expenditure in the sector is:
Et = ptCt = pt
PNt
j=1 yt(j)
where pt is the price of the homogenous good and Ct its consumption in
period t.
Assuming that all rms take total expenditure as given in each pe-
riod,4 their perceived inverse demand function must be pt = Et=
PNt
j=1 yt(j).
2Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b) and Bergin and Corsetti (2005) have introduced the
translog preferences (due to Feenstra, 2003) to derive an elasticity of substitution
between products that depends on the number of rms. As long as entry increases
the substitutability between the existing goods, this generates mark ups depending
on the number of goods, but such an ad hoc explanation is unrelated to endogenous
motivations on the supply side, which are the focus of our paper.
3See Etro and Colciago (2007) for a related analysis of competition in prices with
product di¤erentiation in a macroeconomic model of the business cycle.
4In Etro and Colciago (2007) we have studied a related model with multiple
markets where sectorial expenditure is constant in equilibrium.
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Accordingly, the nominal prots of rm i are:
t(i)=

pt   Wt
A

yt(i) =
=
yt(i)Et
NtX
j=1
yt(j)
  Wtyt(i)
At
Assume that in each period, the Nt rms compete in quantities,
choosing their individual production yt(i) to maximize prots taking as
given the production of all the other rms. The Cournot equilibrium
generates the symmetric individual output:
yt =
(Nt   1)EtAt
WtN2t
Substituting in the inverse demand, one obtains the equilibrium price:
pt =
Nt
Nt   1

Wt
At

(1)
which is associated with the equilibrium mark up (Nt) = Nt=(Nt   1).
This equilibrium generates individual prots t(Nt) = Et=N2t in nominal
terms. Since the equilibrium price of the consumption good is pt, it is
convenient to express all the variables in units of consumption, that is
in real terms (alternatively one can use the consumption good as the
numeraire). Then, real prots t(Nt) = t(Nt)=pt become:
t(Nt) =
Ct
N2t
(2)
and the real wage wt = Wt=pt can be derived from the equilibrium pricing
relation as:
wt =
(Nt   1)
Nt
At (3)
When the number of rms increases, the equilibrium prices goes down
and the wage goes up, with the former approaching the marginal cost
and the latter approaching the marginal productivity of labor only for
Nt !1. However, the number of rms in the market is constrained by
the presence of xed costs of entry that endogenously rule the entry of
new rms in the goods market.
In every period N et new rms enter in the market, and, following
Bilbiie et al. (2007a), we assume that a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the (old
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and new) rms exits the market for exogenous reasons. Therefore, the
number of rms follows the equation of motion:
Nt+1 = (1  )(Nt +N et ) (4)
The real value of a rm Vt is the present discounted value of its future
expected prots, or in recursive form:
Vt= (1  )Et

Vt+1 + t+1(Nt+1)
1 + rt+1

=
= (1  )Et

(1 + rt+1)
 1

Vt+1 +
Ct+1
N2t+1

where rt+1 is the real interest rate. The number of rm is endogenous
in the sense that in each period entry occurs until the real value of the
representative rm equates the xed cost of entry. We assume that this
xed cost is equal to =At units of labor, where  > 0. Given the wage
wt = At(Nt   1)=Nt, the endogenous entry condition amounts to:
Vt =
(Nt   1)
Nt
(5)
The aggregate resource constraint (in real terms), which must be
satised in each period, is:
Yt=Ct + St = Ntt(Nt) + wtLt
=
Ct
Nt
+ wtLt
where St are savings and Lt is total labor supply and we used the equi-
librium expression for prots. Using the market clearing condition that
equates savings and investments St = It = N et Ft = N
e
t Vt, the budget
constraint provides the following expression for savings:
St = N
e
t Vt = wtLt  
Nt   1
Nt
Ct
By Walraslaw labor supply equates labor demand in each period. For
simplicity, we will now assume that labor supply is exogenous and nor-
malized to unity.
To close the model we need to introduce a consumption function.
For expository purposes we will approach the issue in two ways. First
we will follow the Solow approach and assume that the savings rate
is constant in every period, then we will augment the model with a
standard utility maximizing agent choosing their savings in each period.
The rst approach will be useful to introduce the growth mechanism of
this economy, the second one to examine in further details the reaction
of this economy to exogenous shocks.
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2.1 A Solow Model with Cournot Competition
In this section we will introduce the endogenous market structure char-
acterized in the previous section in a dynamic framework that resembles
the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956), where savings are a con-
stant fraction of income (which in our framework includes prots as well).
This allows us to obtain a dynamic model in which it is not investment in
the physical capital to generate the accumulation of capital input over
time, as in the Solow model, but it is entry of new rms to generate
the creation of new productive business. Since entry strengthens com-
petition, entry also induces a sort of decreasing marginal productivity
of business creation, just like capital accumulation reduces the marginal
productivity of capital in the Solow model. Therefore both models gen-
erate a gradual convergence toward a steady state, in the Solow case
through a decreasing rate of the growth of the capital stock, in our case
through a decreasing rate of business creation.
Following the standard approach of Solow (1956) we now assume that
savings are a fraction s 2 (0; 1) of income, St = sYt. From the budget
constraint, these relationships imply:
Yt=
(1  s)Yt
Nt
+ wt =
=
(1  s)Yt
Nt
+
(Nt   1)
Nt
A
where we used the equilibrium expression for the wage. Solving for
income we obtain:
Yt =
(Nt   1)A
Nt   1 + s (6)
which is an increasing function of the number of rms. Applying the
equality of savings St = sYt and investment It = N et Vt, we can solve for
the equilibrium number of new rms:
N et =
sNtA
(Nt   1 + s) 
where we also used the equation (5) to substitute for, endogenous, value
of the rm. Plugging the above expression in the equation of motion for
the number of rms we have:
Nt+1 = Nt (1  ) + s(1  )A
   (1 s)
Nt
(7)
It is immediate to verify that the right hand side is increasing and
concave in Nt, and when Nt approaches innity its slopes tends to
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Figure 1: Dynamic creation of rms.
(1  ) < 1 (see Figure 1). This allows us to conclude that the dynamic
of the economy is stable around its unique steady state. When the initial
number of rms is low, savings contribute to create new rms, but new
rms strengthen competition reducing the prots and the incentives to
enter. The steady state number of rms is:5
N = 1 + s

A(1  )  


(8)
which is increasing in the savings rate s and in the value of TFP A, and
decreasing in the exit rate  and in the relative size of the xed costs .
The equilibrium endogenously generates imperfect competition between
a positive but limited number of rms producing the homogenous good.
Notice that dynamic ine¢ ciency holds, since a better allocation of re-
sources could be achieved reducing the number of rms and the waste
in xed costs of production of a homogenous good.
Of course, the dynamic path of output and consumption can be de-
termined residually from that of the number of rms. When the latter
increases toward its steady state value, output increases as well toward
5Notice that an increase in TFP has a positive impact on the steady state number
of rms. This would disappear if the cost of entry parameter  was proportional to
the size of the economy.
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its steady state value. The latter is:
Y = A

1  
(1  )A

(9)
Finally, notice that the model allows us to analyze the reaction of
the economy to simple shocks. For instance, in case of an unexpected
technological shock that moves the economy away from the steady state,
the increase in prots attracts entry. Entry of new rms strengthens
competition, which in turn depresses mark ups.
2.2 A Ramsey Model with Cournot Competition
Let us now move to a model with endogenous consumption.6 Consider
a representative agent with lifetime utility:
U = Et
1X
t=0
t logCt (10)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and Ct is consumption of a ho-
mogenous good.
The representative agent maximizes lifetime utility by choosing how
much to invest in risk free bonds and risky stocks out of labor and prot
income. The ow budget constraint expressed in real terms is:
Bt+1+Vt(Nt+N
e
t )xt+1+Ct = wt+(1+ rt)Bt+[t(Nt) + Vt]Ntxt (11)
where Bt is net bond holdings and xt is the share of the stock market
value of the rms that are owned by the agent. The rst order conditions
with respect to xt+1 and Bt+1 are respectively:
Vt(Nt +N
e
t )C
 1
t = Et

[t+1 (Nt+1) + Vt+1]Nt+1C
 1
t+1
	
(12)
C 1t = (1 + rt+1)EtC
 1
t+1 (13)
Equation (12) is an asset pricing equation for stocks and equation (13)
is a standard Euler equation for bonds. Using the equation of motion for
the number of rms (4), the equilibrium real wage (3), the endogenous
entry condition (5) and the denition of prots (2), we can rewrite (12)
as
Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 1
(Nt+1   1)
Nt+1
+
Ct+1
N2t+1
#
=

(1  )
Nt   1
Nt
(14)
6To preserve continuity we the model outlined in the previous section, we do not
consider endogenous labor choices here. However we do it in Appendix C, where we
also allow for the possibility of taste shocks. Notice that part of the business cycle
analysis conducted below draws on the model described in the Appendix.
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The ow budget constraint under the equilibrium conditions Bt =
1   xt = 0 for any t, leads to the aggregate resource constraint of the
economy:
Ct + VtN
e
t = wt + t(Nt)Nt (15)
which, as usual, states that the sum of consumption and investment
must be equal to total income from labor and prots. After simple
manipulations we obtain from the latter the number of new entrants in
each period:
N et =
(At   Ct)

Substituting this into the equation of motion for the number of rms we
get:
Nt+1 = (1  )

Nt +
At   Ct


(16)
Given an exogenous processes for At, the system composed by equations
(14) and (16) fully characterizes the dynamic behavior of Ct and Nt. As
shown in appendix A, the deterministic steady state of the economy is
characterized by the following two equations:7
N=
(1  ) (A  C)

C=

(1  )
(1  (1  ))

(N   1)N
where a variable without time index denotes a steady state value. The
rst steady state relation is a negative relation between consumption and
the number of rms, the second one is a positive and convex relation. It
follows that the steady state is unique and characterized by a positive
number of rms as depicted in Figure 2.
Finally, notice that, as in the Solow model with imperfect compe-
tition, also in the Ramsey version dynamic ine¢ ciency holds (see Etro
and Colciago, 2007, for a generalization of this result).
2.3 Other forms of Competition
Until now we have focused our analysis of the endogenous market struc-
tures on Cournot competition. One of the main aim of this paper is to
emphasize the need of a deeper investigation of the industrial organiza-
tion of the markets in macroeconomic models. Therefore, in this section
7As in the previous model, also in this case an increase in TFP has a positive
impact on the number of rms in steady state. Again, this would disappear if the
cost of entry parameter  was proportional to the size of the economy.
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Figure 2: Steady state and saddle path stability in the Ramsey model.
we will import from the industrial organization literature8 the analysis
of other forms of competition. Further work in this direction, of course,
is needed.
2.3.1 Conjectural Variations Approach
A simple extension of the Cournot model of competition can be obtained
assuming general conjectural variations of the rms. Assuming that each
rm takes as given the di¤erential impact of its output choice on the
output choice of the other rms   @xt(j)=@xt(i), the equilibrium price
can be obtained as:
pt(;Nt) =
Nt
(Nt   1)(1  )
Wt
At
which nests the case of Cournot competition in quantities for  = 0
and tends to the (indeterminate) case of perfect collusion for  ! 1.
More importantly, intermediate situations with  2 (0; 1) describe cases
of imperfect collusion between the rms which achieve mark ups above
the Cournot level but below the perfect collusion level. Then, the real
prots are:
t(;Nt) =
[(Nt   1)+ 1]Ct
N2t
8See Etro (2007,a) on the industrial organization of endogenous market structures.
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In the Ramsey model, the equilibrium system becomes:
Nt+1 = (1  )

Nt +
At   Ct


Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
 1 
(Nt+1   1)
Nt+1

(1  )Nt+1 + Ct+1
Nt+1

+
Ct+1
N2t+1
)
=
(Nt   1)(1  )
(1  )Nt
which boils down to the previous one for  = 0. Its dynamic properties
will be examined in the next section.
2.3.2 Stackelberg Competition
Another relevant case emerges in the presence of asymmetries between
rms, and is based on the theory of Stackelberg competition. Here we
simply assume that the leader adopts the optimal static strategy in each
period.
Let us assume that a single leader is always active in the representa-
tive sector and Nt followers are active in each period. The Stackelberg
equilibrium can be derived with an equilibrium price:
p(Nt) =
Nt
(Nt   1=2)
Wt
At
which is lower than under pure Cournot competition in quantities. The
prots of the leader and the representative follower are respectively larger
and smaller than the prots under Cournot competition:
Lt (Nt) =
Ct
4Nt
Ft (Nt) =
Ct
4N2t
Since we assumed that entry and exit concerns only the followers, whose
value is always pinned down by the endogenous entry condition:9
V Ft =
(Nt   1)
Nt
the value of the leading rm must be calculated separately as the ex-
pected discounted value of its future prots:
V Lt = Et

V Lt+1 + 
L
t+1(Nt+1)
1 + rt+1

=
= Et

Vt+1 + (Ct+1) =4Nt+1
1 + rt+1

9The assumption that also the leader cannot commit to a sequence of strategies
is crucial here. If the leader could commit, it would engage in aggressive strategies
aimed at reducing or deterring entry in the long run. See Etro (2008b) for a recent
analysis of Stackelberg competition with commitment and endogenous entry.
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In this case, the equilibrium system becomes:
Nt+1 = (1  )

Nt +
At   Ct


Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 1

(Nt+1   1=2)
Nt+1
+
Ct+1
4N2t+1
#
=

(1  )
(Nt   1=2)
Nt
whose dynamic properties will be analyzed in the next section.
3 Business Cycle Analysis
As customary, we solve the model by log-linearization around the de-
terministic steady.10 In the remainder we assume that the technology
shock evolve according to an autoregressive process of the form
log(At=A) = 0:9 log(At 1=A) + "t
where "t is an independently and identically distributed random variable
with variance 2";
In the next subsections we analyze the dynamic properties of the
Ramsey model with imperfect competition. We will consider the behav-
ior of the model in response to both technology (temporary and perma-
nent) and demand shocks. Calibrations of parameters is standard. The
time unit is meant to be a quarter. The discount factor, , is set to
0.99, while we follow Bilbiie et al (2007b) and set the rate of business
destruction, , equals 0.025 implying an annual rate equal to 10 percent.
Also the baseline parameterization features  = A = 1.
3.1 Permanent technology shocks
To shed light on the dynamics implied by the model we initially con-
sider the response to a permanent technology shock. Figure 3 reports
the response of the main macroeconomic variables to a one percent per-
manent increase in technology under Cournot competition.11 On the
vertical axis we report percentage deviations of variables from the initial
steady state. Time on the horizontal axis is in quarters. The steady
10Steady state analysis is carried out in Appendix A. Appendix B provides, instead,
log-linear equilibrium conditions and an analysis of local stability and uniqueness of
the rational expectation equilibrium.
11The model has been solved using DYNARE a software devoloped by Michele
Juillard. In the case of permanent shocks the impulse response functions are actually
deterministic simulations. For a given path of the exogenous variable DYNARE
provides the response of the whole system assuming that variables are initially at the
steady state. This is done by stucking all the equations of the system for all periods
and solving the resulting system en bloc using the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics after a permanent technology shift un-
der Cornot Competition
state mark up is endogenously determined and equals 22 % at the initial
steady state.
Improved technological conditions create prots opportunities which,
in turn, attract new rms into the market. This triggers stronger mar-
ket competition and forces rms to decrease their mark ups. Despite
lower markups, prots are above the initial level during the whole tran-
sition to the new steady state. This is so since the mark up reduction
stimulates consumption demand which grants positive prots to pro-
ducers. As the number of producers and the mark up converge to their
new steady state levels the number of entrants settles down to a perma-
nently higher value. Although a higher number of entrants requires a
permanently higher level of investment on the side of the households the
expansion in the production possibilities allows to attain permanently
higher consumption.
At a micro-level the mechanism is as follows. Recall that the cost of
entry equals the stock market value of the rm in each instant. Since
the wage jumps on impact by the same amount of the technology shock,
the entry cost, which is measured in unit of e¤ective labor, is initially
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unchanged. As the number of rms start increasing the mark up goes
down leading the real wage to increase more than proportionally with
respect to technology. This determines an increase in the cost of entry
which is mirrored in the dynamic of the stock market value. The previ-
ous analysis justies the reallocation of the xed labor supply between
the production of the nal good and the creation of new rms. With
an unchanged entry cost, there is a strong increase in the number of
new entrants, which drives up the demand of hours for the creation of
new rms. As the stock cost of entry reaches its new, higher, equilib-
rium value investment in new rms decreases and labor is reallocated to
the production of the nal good. Meanwhile, the number of rms has
increased and the mark up has gone down.
Notice that the dynamic of the model are governed by the same
intertemporal substitution mechanisms which characterize the standard
RBC model, with investment in new rms playing the role of investment
in capital goods. Nevertheless it adds to the latter framework a new
competition e¤ect which, through its consequences for rmsstrategic
pricing decision, is capable of addressing basic empirical facts such as
countercyclicality of mark ups and procyclicality of aggregate prots.
The qualitative dynamics described in the case of Cournot Compe-
tition are preserved also under alternative market arrangements. Figure
4 provides transitional dynamics for the Conjectural Variation model
(dashed lines), with  = 0:15, together with those delivered by the
Stackelberg competition model (solid lines) in the face of a permanent
technology shift. The initial mark up in the conjectural variation case
amounts to 34 % while it is 15 % under Stackelberg competition.
As shown in the gure, the Stackelberg competition framework dis-
plays an asymmetric response between the individual variables of the
leader and those of the representative follower. Consider, as an exam-
ple, the dynamic of the stock market value. While the market value of
follower is pinned down on a period-by-period basis by the entry cost,
that of the leader is determined by the discounted value of its futures
prots. Since the latter unambiguously undertake a positive variation,
the leaders market value jumps on impact.
The larger variations in aggregate prots under imperfect collusion
promotes a stronger long run change in investment which translates into
a higher variation in the number of producers. The competition e¤ect
then implies a relatively stronger decrease in the markup with respect to
that observed under Stackelberg competition leading to a higher varia-
tion in the long run level of consumption and output. Importantly, both
market structures deliver procyclicality of prots and mark up counter-
cyclicality.
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Figure 5: Impulse response to a temporary technology shock under
Cournot competition
3.2 Temporary technology shocks
Let us now consider a temporary increase in technology. Since it is
of interest to compare business cycles generated by our framework with
those delivered by the prototype RBCmodel, we also report the response
of variables in the case of endogenous labor supply.12 Figure 5 depicts
the impulse response of the economic system to a one percent temporary
shock to At. Continuous lines refer to the case with xed labor supply,
while dashed line to that with endogenous labor.13
Similar mechanisms to those emphasized above are at work. The
direction of movements of the variable is identical to that described in
the case of a permanent shock, the main di¤erence being the absence of
a long run e¤ect.
As in the standard RBC model the temporary technology shock in-
12Appendix C outlines the model with endogenous labor supply.
13Without loss of generality we set utility parameters such that steady state labor
supply equals 1. In the latter case the Frish elasticity of labor supply reduces to ' to
which we assign a value of 4 as in King and Rebelo (2000). Please see Appendix C
for details.
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creases consumption. However, di¤erently from what happens in the
afore mentioned framework, the impact of the shock on consumption is
enhanced by deeper competition. Entry of new rms fosters competition
and temporarily reduces the mark ups. This provides an extra boost to
the intertemporal substitution of future for present consumption with
respect to the case in which mark ups are constant or absent. Increased
private demand of the nal good fuels prots which, despite lower mark
ups, stay above the baseline for several quarters.
The propagation of the shock is much stronger in the case of endoge-
nous labor supply. The higher real wage boosts labor supply which trans-
lates into a substantial impact increase in output. This allows higher
rmsentry and thus a stronger countercyclical mark up response.
To economize on space we do not report the dynamic response to
a temporary shock for the Conjectural Variations and the Stackelberg
competition models, however considerations made above extend to these
cases.14
Figure 6 summarizes the sensitivity of our results to the value as-
sumed by the entry cost parameter  in the baseline case of Cournot
competition. To avoid excessive cluttering of the graphs we focus on the
case with exogenous labor supply. Market concentration, dened as the
inverse of the number of rms in the market, increases in the cost of
entry.15 This is mirrored in the value of markups which are relevantly
di¤erent across the two specications.
The mark up is 6 % when  = 0:1 (solid lines) and 34 % when  = 2
(dashed lines). While results are not qualitatively a¤ected by the degree
of market concentration, they are from a quantitative point of view.
Deeper competition implies a stronger impact response of consumption
and output, while dampens variability of stock market values. Prots
increase more markedly on impact, but faster rmsentry brings them
back to equilibrium, with a period of negative variation corresponding
to the peak in the number of rms, after few quarters.
14Figures concerning temporary shocks for competitive frameworks other than
Cournot are available from the authors.
15A common measure of market concentration is the Herndhal Index, HI =PN
i=1 s
2
i 2 (0; 1), where si is the market share of rms i and N denotes the number
of rms in the market. An HI above 0.18 is conventionally taken as an evidence of
high market concentration. In a simmetric Cournot equilibrium, each rm holds the
same market share. For this reson we take 1=N as a masure of market concentration.
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Figure 6: Impulse response to a temporary technology shock under
Cournot competition. Sensitivity to .
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3.3 Temporary Preference Shock
In this section we consider the impact of a temporary change in demand
determined by a preference shock.16 We assume that the preference
shifter t follows the rst order autoregressive process
log (t=) = 0:9 log (t=) + "t
where  is a parameter and "t is an independently and identically dis-
tributed random variable. We follow Wen (2006) and assume that at
the steady state 
C
= 0:1.17 Figure 7 depicts the response of key vari-
ables to a one percent increase in t under Cournot competition. As in
the previous section, continuous lines refer to the case with endogenous
labor supply, while dashed line to that with xed labor. As emphasized
by Baxter and King (1992) and more recently by Wen (2006), taste
shocks in standard general equilibrium models generates countercyclical
investment dynamics due to the crowding out e¤ect.18
This is not the case in our framework, as long as we allow for en-
dogenous labor supply. In that case the model replicates the positive
comovement between output, consumption and investment which char-
acterize a typical business cycle. Notice also that the comovement be-
tween output, aggregate prots and the mark up has the "right" sign.
Our intuition for this result goes as follows. When labor supply is xed
an increase in investment in the aftermath of the shock would require
a shift of the xed quantity of labor from the production of the nal
good to the making of new rms. In this case, however, the household
would not be able to satisfy her desire to consume. Thus, the increase in
demand can be satised uniquely through disinvestment. This generates
a perverse cycle which by reducing the number of new entrants and the
overall number of rms ultimately leads to a higher mark up. On the
contrary when labor supply is endogenous agents have and additional
channel through which they can react to the shock. By increasing total
hours worked they can set up new rms without decreasing the produc-
16Appendix C introduces preference shocks into the model. In a nutshell, the
felicity from consumption reads now as log (Ct  t), thus a temporary positive
variation in t leads to an urgency to consume by temporarily increasing marginal
utility of consumption.
17Empirical evidence cannot say much about the steady state ratio C . For this
reason we follow the literature and give it a, conservative, small value. As the value
of the ratio increases the impact response of variables, as well as their variability, in
the face of a demand shock are amplied.
18Investment increases on impact in the baseline RBC model if one assumes that
the taste shock has a near randow walk behavior. Clearly, however, this ad hoc
solution does not settle the issue.
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tion of the nal good. The increase in hours allows a contemporaneous
positive impact variation of investment and consumption.19
Clearly the volatility of variables in response to the shock is low.
However our intent is that of proving the capability of the model to
generate a standard business cycle in the face of a demand shock and not
that of explaining business cycle variability resorting solely to demand
shocks.20
Before concluding this section we wish to remark that procyclicality
of aggregate prots and mark ups countercyclicality are preserved in the
face of both demand and supply shocks, and under all the competitive
frameworks we have considered. In our view this is a strong argument
in favor of a competition-based explanation of these evidence we want
to address and, as a consequence, of the relevance of market structure
endogeneity for business cycle modelling.
19Similar results apply in the cases of Stackelberg competition and Conjectural
Variations. Results are available from the authors.
20Notice also that the initial shock has a small magnitude in terms of steady state
consumption. It amounts to 1 percent of the steady state value of , which in turn
represents 10 percent of steady state consumption.
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3.4 A comparison with standard RBC
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for
the business cycle, we compute second moments of the key macroeco-
nomic variables. In this exercise we follow the RBC literature by focus-
ing on the case with endogenous labor supply and assuming that the
only source of random uctuations are technology shocks. Moreover, to
compare the performance of our model to that of the mainstream RBC
model, we take the calibration of the parameters characterizing the tech-
nology process from King and Rebelo (2000). Namely we set the shock
persistence to A = 0:979 and its standard deviation to A = 0:0072.
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V ariables  (X)  (X) = (Y ) E (Xt; Xt 1) Corr(X; Y )
Y 1:66; 1:39 1 0:84; 0:72 1
C 1:24; 0:60 0:75; 0:43 0:80; 0:78 0:76; 0:94
I 5:00; 4:09 3:01; 2:59 0:88; 0:70 0:79; 0:98
L 1:82; 0:67 1:10; 0:48 0:90; 0:70 0:88; 0:97
 8:08; n:a 4:87; n:a 0:76; n:a 0:67; n:a
 1:87; n:a 1:13; n:a 0:85; n:a  0:27; n:a
Table 1: Second moments. Left: US data. Right: RBC model
For future reference we report in Table 1 the performance of the
standard RBC model, under the specied calibration, with respect to
the statistics on US data (19471/2007-3) for output Y , consumption
C, investment I, labor force L, aggregate prots  and the mark up
.22 As well known, the main problems of the RBC model are the lim-
ited variability of output and especially consumption and hours, and the
lack of explanations for the cyclical movement of prots and mark ups.
21We use the same process as in King and Rebelo (2000) for comparison purposes
with the RBC literature and with Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b). Notice that Jaimovich and
Floetotto (2008) have prepared a measure of the TFP based on U.S. data taking into
account the mark up variability and then tting an AR (1) process to the constructed
series. While they do not nd signicant di¤erences from King and Rebelo (2000) in
the estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient, they estimate a lower standard deviation of
TFP innovations. Although our results are marginally a¤ected by a change in A,
the main message of the analysis is not altered.
22Variables have been logged. We report theoretical moments of HP ltered vari-
ables with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600. Prots include both the remu-
naration of capital and the extra-prots due to market power: while we could not
distinguish between the two, future research may try to do it. Please refer to Etro
and Colciago (2007) for a full description of the data set.
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Table 2 reports second moments of Y , C, I  N eV , L, , and mark
up  for our model with Cournot competition. The gures suggest that
this competitive frameworks can reach a more realistically high volatility
of consumption than the RBC. This is obtained at the expenditure of
volatility of aggregate output and labor supply. However, these are still
in line with those resulting form the standard RBC. More importantly,
the model performs quite well in matching the contemporaneous corre-
lation with output of mark ups and prots, on which the neoclassical
model is completely silent.
V ariables  (X)  (X) = (Y ) E (Xt; Xt 1) Corr (X;Y )
Y 1:36 1 0:67 1
C 0:87 0:64 0:78 0:94
I 5:86 4:31 0:63 0:92
L 0:57 0:42 0:60 0:93
 0:70 0:51 0:63 0:99
 0:09 0:07 0:93  0:29
Table 2: Second moments under Cournot Competition
Table 3 accounts for the statistics delivered by the model with Stack-
elberg Competition (left) and for the Conjectural Variations approach
when  = 0:15 (right). Stackelberg competition, while displaying a poor
performance, with respect to the RBC, in terms of output volatility de-
livers a remarkably high (relative and absolute) variability of consump-
tion, suggesting a considerable propagation mechanism of the shock.
The Conjectural Variations approach reproduces a volatility of variables
closer to that found in the data. We do not further emphasize the
good performance of this model because of its somehow ad hoc nature.
However, we interpreter it as suggesting that competitive frameworks in-
volving a degree of collusion stronger than that implied by the Cournot
model could help improving the performance of dynamic general equi-
librium models at replicating the features of the business cycle. Both
table 2 and 3 show that variablesautocorrelation is lower with respect
to that which shows up in the data. This could be accommodated, as
suggested by Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b), by imposing a longer time to build
up a new rm.23
23However, this would come together with the cost of imposing more exogenous
features on the neat framework presented.
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V ariables  (X)  (X) = (Y ) E (Xt; Xt 1) Corr (X; Y )
Y 1:29; 1:51 1 0:66; 0:68 1
C 0:88; 0:78 0:68; 0:51 0:77; 0:78 0:95; 0:93
I 6:72; 5:91 5:21; 3:91 0:57; 0:65 0:90; 0:97
L 0:47; 0:84 0:36; 0:56 0:57; 0:65 0:90; 0:96
 0:71; 0:71 0:55; 0:46 0:60; 0:71 0:98; 0:99
 0:07; 0:07; 0:05; 0:05 0:93; 0:94  0:32; 0:17
Table 3: Second moments. Left: Stackelberg Competition; Right: Con-
jectural Variations with lambda=0.15
Overall we regard the performance of the plain vanilla Cournot model
with homogeneous good as an improvement with respect to that of the
standard exible prices model of the business cycle. It delivers moment
of output, hours and investment which are in line with those of the
RBC model and it provides a better approximation of the variability of
consumption in front of real shocks. The little analytical complication
involved in the supply side of the model is rewarded by its ability of
partially reproducing the cyclical properties of markups and aggregate
prots on which the neoclassical model is silent.
4 Conclusions
In this article we have studied a dynamic model with exible prices and
homogenous goods where the structures of the markets is endogenous
and accounts for strategic interactions of di¤erent kinds. We considered
both a Solow-type economy with exogenous saving and a Ramsey-type
economy with maximizing consumers.
Our approach belongs to the emerging literature on endogenous entry
in the macroeconomy (Bilbiie et al., 2007a,b; Lewis, 2007; Etro and
Colciago, 2007) and, as others, it provides some improvements in the
explanation of the business cycle compared to the standard real exible
prices framework.
In particular our Ramsey model with Cournot competition repro-
duces standard business cycles in the face of both demand and supply
shocks. When tested against a temporary technology shock it deliv-
ers second moments of macroeconomic variables which are in line with
those provided by the standard RBC model. Further, it adds to the lat-
ter framework an endogenous characterization of the market structure
which allows to explain the procyclical variability of prots together with
the countercyclical variability of mark ups found in the data.
The model could be easily extended in various directions. For exam-
24
ple in Etro and Colciago (2007) we account for a multisector economy
with imperfectly sustitutable goods. Also it could be employed for the
analysis of open economy issues to study international business cycle as
in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and optimal policy coordination in an open
economy context
Finally we wish to remark that the approach taken in this paper
constitutes a very simple and neat framework for the introduction of
market structure endogeneity and strategic interactions in a business
cycle model and, as such, could be a valuable teaching tool.
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Appendix A: steady state
This appendix shows that the model with endogenous savings displays,
for a given number of rms, constant steady state output shares of consump-
tion, investment, prots and labor income. We provide details relative to the
Cournot case, but identical steps apply to the other competitive frameworks
we have considered in the text.
The steady state counterpart of the aggregate resource constraint is Y =
C+I . Since I = N eV the latter can equivalently be written as 1 = C
Y
+ N
eV
Y
.
Evaluating at the steady state the Euler equation for bonds delivers  = 1
1+r
,
where r is the steady state interest rate. The steady state counterpart of the
Euler equation for stock holdings yields the steady state value of a rm as:
V =
1  
r + 

or, using steady state prots:
V =

1  
r + 

C
N2

The share of prots over consumption is N
C
= 1
N
while the share of invest-
ment over aggregate consumption reads as:
V N e =
1  
r + 
N e =

r + 
N
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where we considered that the number of new entrants at the steady state is

1 N . Using previous results, the ratio of investment over total consumption
reads as:
N eV
C
=

r + 
N
C
=

r + 
1
N
To compute the output share of aggregate consumption notice that:
1 =
C
Y
+
N eV
C
C
Y
=
C
Y

1 +

r + 
1
N

thus the share of private consumption over output is:
C
Y
=

1 +

r + 
1
N
 1
The output share of investment is instead:
I
Y
=
N eV
C
C
Y
=

r + 
1
N
C
Y
=

(r + )N + 
while the share of prots over aggregate output is:
N
Y
=
r + 
1  
1  

N eV
Y
=
r + 

N eV
Y
=
r + 
(r + )N + 
Finally notice that the output share of labor income, wL
Y
, depends on the
steady state number of rms as follows:
wL
Y
= 1  r + 
(r + )N + 
To fully characterize the steady state it remains to determine the number
of producing rms. This can be obtained by substituting equation (14) into
equation (16), and evaluating the resulting expression at the steady state.
The steady state number of rms is the value of N which solves the following
equation:
N =


 + (N   1) (1  (1  ))

(1  )

A
which clearly has a unique solution.
Appendix B: local stability and uniqueness
This appendix studies local uniqueness and non-explosiveness of the ra-
tional expectation equilibrium of the model with endogenous savings and
Cournot competition, whose steady state was provided in Appendix A. Given
our purpose we can restrict our analysis to a deterministic setting . In this
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case log-linear approximations around the steady state of equations (16) and
(14) read respectively as
nt+1 = (1  )nt   ( + r) (N   1) ct (17)
and
Etct+1 =
(1  )  2 ( + r) (N   1)
(N   1) (1  ) nt+1 
(1 + r)
(N   1) (1  )nt+
(1 + r)
(1  )ct
(18)
Rearranging yields a system of two equations into two variables with the
following matrix form 
Etct+1
nt+1

= B

ct
nt

where B is a 2 2 matrix of coe¢ cients, ct is a forward looking variable and
nt+1 is a state variable. In general, the characteristic polynomial of matrix
B reads as H () = 2   Trace (B) + det (B), and the condition for
stability and uniqueness of the equilibrium is H (1)H ( 1) < 0. Matrix B
is characterized by the following coe¢ cients:
B (1; 1)= (1+r)
(1 )  ( + r)+2 (+r)(+r)(1 ) (N   1)
B (1; 2)=   1
N 1
(1+r)
(1 )+
(1 )
N 1 2 ( + r)
B (2; 1)=   ( + r) (N   1) ;B (2; 2)= (1  )
It follows that:
trace (B) =
(1 + r)
(1  )   ( + r) + 2
( + r) ( + r)
(1  ) (N   1) + (1  )
and
det (B) = (1 + r)  (1 + r) ( + r)
(1  )
In this case:
H (1) =
( + r)
(1  ) [r (1  2N)  2N] < 0
and
H ( 1) = 4 + 2r   ( + r)
(1  ) [r (1  2N)  2N] > 0
since N > 1. Therefore the equilibrium is always unique and locally stable.
The same result holds under the alternative competitive frameworks we have
considered in the text.
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Appendix C: the Ramsey model with endogenous labor
supply and taste shocks
The Ramsey model can be easily extended to endogenous labor supply
and taste shocks. In this case the representative agent has expected lifetime
utility given by:
U = Et
1X
t=0
t
(
log (Ct  t)   L
1+1='
t
1 + 1='
)
; '  0
where Lt represents hours worked and t is a random variable which permits
us to analyze demand shocks. As described in Baxter and King (1991) and
more recently in Wen (2006), a positive innovation to t by increasing the
marginal utility of consumption leads to an urgency to consume. The rst
order conditions with respect to xt+1 and Bt+1 read respectively as:
Vt(Nt+N
e
t ) (Ct  t) 1 = Et

[t+1 (Nt+1) + Vt+1]Nt+1 (Ct+1  t+1) 1
	
and
(Ct  t) 1 = (1 + rt+1)Et (Ct+1  t+1) 1
Notice that with respect to the analysis in the main text we also we have an
extra rst order condition with respect to Lt:
Lt =

1
(Ct  t)
wt

'
Substituting this into the aggregate resource constraint delivers the number
of new entrants as
N et =
1


A1+'t

1
(Ct  t)
(Nt   1)
Nt
'
  Ct

The latter in conjunction with the dynamic equation describing the evolution
of the number of rms delivers
Nt+1 = (1  )Nt + 1  


A1+'t

1
(Ct  t)
(Nt   1)
Nt
'
  Ct

(19)
The equilibrium equation for the dynamic of consumption is now
Et
"
Ct+1  t+1
Ct  t
 1
 (Nt+1   1)
Nt+1
+
Ct+1
N2t+1
#
=

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Equations (19) and (20) together with the exogenous processes for At and t
specied in the text determine the equilibrium path of consumption and the
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number of rms, from which we can obtain the dynamics of the other relevant
variables. Assuming that the steady state ratio 
C
=  (= 0.1 in our baseline
calibration, as in Wen, 2006), steady state analysis is the same as before with
labor supply satisfying.
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The steady state number of rms is the value of N that solves the following
equation:
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which, given the right hand side is decreasing in N, has a unique solution.
Equation (19) takes the following log-linear form:
nt+1 = nnt   cct + aat + t
with the associated coe¢ cients dened as n =
(1 )(N 1)+'(+n)
(N 1) , a =
(1 + ') ( + n), c = [' + (1 + ') n] and  =
(+n)
(1 ) where n =
( + r) (N   1).
The log-linear version of equation (20) is:
Etct+1 = zn+1nt+1  znnt +zcct +zEt (t+1   t)
with coe¢ cients dened as zn+1 = c 2n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n , zn =
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c(N 1) n , zc =
(1+r)
c (+r) and z =
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c (+r) where c = (1  ) (1  ).
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